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I. INTRODUCTION
The real estate brokerage industry in the United States has a
significant liability exposure problem. The liability exposure arises
from both the application of agency law principles and judicially
imposed duties regarding treatment of parties opposite a broker's
principal. If you think the foregoing characterization is extreme,
examine at least the evidence presented here and then draw your own
conclusions. The facts are convincing that the brokerage industry
faces substantial problems in the area of agency affecting not only
financial liability, but also public confidence. The intent of this
This study has been prepared under a grant from the Florida Real Estate
Commission Education and Research Foundation..
2 H. Glenn Boggs is a professor at Florida State University's College of Business.
He is a 1975 graduate of FSU's College of Law. and a 1968 graduate of the U.S. Naval
Academy at Annapolis. After admission to the, Florida Bar in 1976, he spent a year in
general practice with a Tallahassee firm and later worked as an attorney on The Florida Bar
staff from 1977 to 1981. He has been a member FSU faculty since then.
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article is to carefully identify the problems, marshall the facts, and
propose a solution to avoid further dislocations in the industry.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The two main dimensions of the agency law problem confronting
the real estate brokerage industry are distinct, yet sometimes overlap.
The first dimension is best described as a "subagency" problem, and
the second involves problems concerning the broker's duties to a
"nonprincipal".
The difficulty of subagency problems usually develops in the
context of a multiple listing service (MLS) transaction. Initially, a
broker reaches agreement with an owner to sell the owner's property.
After a listing contract is signed, the owner (seller) becomes a
principal in an agency relationship with the listing broker who,
because of the agency relationship, owes the seller a "fiduciary duty"
of loyalty and service.
Frequently, a listing broker does not personally locate a buyer for
specific properties listed in the MLS. Real estate sales usually result
from another broker's efforts in working with a potential buyer after
identifying an MLS listed property that satisfies the buyer's needs.
The other broker, or "selling broker", has often been regarded as an
agent, or subagent, of the listing broker. In these instances, the
selling broker, like the listing broker, owes a fiduciary duty of
loyalty and service to the seller.
Unfortunately, this legal entanglement leaves unsuspecting buyers
without an agent in the transaction and, consequently, more
vulnerable. Buyers with some knowledge of the subagency
principles involved become frustrated. Selling brokers are also placed
at risk because they may either fail to adequately represent the seller,
whom they may have never met, or allow an unintended agency
relationship to develop with the buyer. In the latter situation, an
unintended dual agency is created. Dual agency relationships present
numerous legal problems. These will be examined later in more
detail.
The second dimension of agency law problems plaguing the real
estate brokerage industry concerns brokers' duties to a
"nonprincipal". Many states impose a legal duty on brokers to treat
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parties opposite their principal in an honest and fair manner. Florida
courts, for example, have imposed this duty whose parameters appear
to be expanding as new conflicts arise. Delineations between a
broker's fiduciary duty to its principal and court-imposed obligations
of honesty, fairness, and disclosure to the principal's opposite party
are becoming increasingly blurred. Persons disappointed with a
transaction on the basis of a broker's alleged failure to adequately
fulfill the broker's duties to the nonprincipal are suing more brokers
more often.
In short, the law governing real estate brokerage and agency lacks
clarity as to the responsibilities shouldered by brokers. Improve-
ments in this area of law will result in better service to the consum-
ing public. If it were not for the fact that many readers may be
skeptical of what has been said so far, this discussion could end now
and statutory language could be proposed to cure the ills identified.
However, many readers want more than broad generalizations and
insist on detailed facts and proof.
One of the most widely cited authorities in this area is a Federal
Trade Commission Report publication entitled The Residential Real
Estate Brokerage Industry.3  This report provides a wealth of
statistical information about the brokerage business, including the
industry's performance, structure and practices. It also contains
consumer information on sellers and buyers. For example, consumer
information on a buyer's knowledge about the role of a broker
indicates that buyers are appallingly mistaken about who the broker
represents. The report states:
Buyer Question 31 asked: "Who do you think the agent who
handled the purchase of your house was representing?" A
total of 57% of the buyers believed that the broker with
whom they were dealing was representing them. A total of
66% of all buyers believed the broker was representing either
the buyer, or the buyer and the seller, in the transaction.
3 FED. TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REP., The Residential Real Estate Brokerage
Industry (1983). 'Ibis two-volume report is the result of a cooperative effort coordinated
by the Los Angeles Regional Office, the Seattle Regional Office, and the Bureau of
Economics under the joint sponsorship of the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer
Protection.
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Thus nearly two-thirds of all buyers in our study believed that
representation was being provided to the buyer.
Where a cooperating broker was involved, 72% of the
buyers believed that the cooperating broker was representing
the buyer and not the seller. Even 31% of the buyers in
transactions where only one broker was involved believed that
the broker represented the buyer.4
Researchers, aware of prior Federal Trade Commission studies,
published yet another study on this same issue in 1988.' They
surveyed 1,000 randomly-selected active Georgia real estate licensees
to determine if they were complying with fiduciary agency law rules
when acting as a listing or selling broker.
These researchers were also aware of the National Association of
Realtor's 1986 Agency Task Force study on brokerage and agency
problems. They quoted from this study advising readers of the Task
Force's conclusion that "states should mandate written disclosure of
agency status. '6 Real estate licensees are now required to disclose
their agency status in a majority of states.7
Although desirable, disclosure of agency status alone is insuffi-
cient to solve the agency problems currently faced by the real estate
brokerage industry. Authors of the Georgia survey reached this same
conclusion after evaluating their data:
Instead of accepting the notion that the residential real estate
marketplace is comprised of many ignorant consumers and
duplicitous agents, an alternative conclusion can be drawn
from studies of real estate buyers and sellers--seller agency is
simplistic in modeling the role of real estate agents in
residential sales. The present study further supports this
alternative.
4 Id at 69 (footnotes omitted).
5 Ball & Norse, Testing the Conventional Representation. Model for Residential
Real Estate Brokerage. 3 J. REAL EST. RES. 119 (1988).
6 Id. at 120.
1 For example. Florida law mandates written agency disclosures by a licensee to the
opposite party prior to the signing of a contract or a lease by the non-principal. FLA. STAT.
§ 475.25(l)(q) (1992).
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The responses to the survey of Georgia licensees indicate that
real estate licensees perceive that (a) buyers are loyal to the
selling agent, (b) sellers often withhold confidential price
information from listing agents, (c) listing agents and selling
agents often do not share confidential price information with
each other in a co-op, (d) listing agents often do not inform
sellers of buyers' confidences, (e) buyers often repose with
and receive from selling agents confidential information, and
(f) the statement of the five given in the questionnaire which
best reflects the role of the selling agent is the one that
describes a dual agent (or, arguably, mediator):
Having the best knowledge of what the property is
worth, the selling agent promotes a sale at what the
agent considers to be fair in price and terms so that
both the buyer and seller end up with a good deal. It
is now evident why consumers, at least in Georgia, do
not realize the roles of the agents in a co-op sale are
that of exclusive agents/ subagents of sellers--it is not
realized by the practitioners themselves !'
Based on the evidence presented, it is clear that changes must be
made in agency law as applied to the real estate brokerage industry.
IH. UNDERSTANDING AGENCY
The theory of agency is applicable to many different professional
and business relationships; it is not unique to real estate brokerage.
The Second Restatement of Agency defines agency and principal as
follows:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from
the manifestation of consent by one person to another
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act.
8 Ball & Norse, supra note 5, at 129.
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(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the princi-
pal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.9
In plain English, agency has the following four components: (1)
A freely given, consensual agreement between two parties; (2) one
party is the principal who can control the conduct (within legal
parameters) of the agent; (3) the other party is the agent who can
affect the principal's legal relations with others; and (4) the agent
owes the principal a fiduciary duty. These agency relationships can
be created without being reduced to a written document. They may
be expressed orally or implied through the actions of the parties.
The parties, then, may negate the need for an oral agreement if their
actions create an agency relationship. That is why real estate
licensees must be careful not to fall inadvertently into unwanted
agency relationships.
Examples of agents other than real estate brokers and salesper-
sons are not difficult to find. Lawyers often act as agents for their
clients. A businessperson can form an agency relationship with
another person to handle one or more series of tasks. As stated in
Florida Real Estate Brokerage and Agency Law:'°
[T]he law of agency often applies when one person under-
takes to perform a service for the benefit of another person.
Normally, the service to be performed involves dealing with
a third party to the transaction .... Often, the principal will
pay the agent for the services received as a normal part of the
agency relationship, and also the principal may be legally
liable for actions of the agent within the scope of the agency
[but payment is not absolutely required].
The key to understanding agency is that the principal and
agent reach an understanding under which the agent serves
the principal on mutually agreeable terms. Once this hap-
pens, and a legal agency arises, there is a special duty or
obligation on the agent. This special obligation is called a
9 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958).
10 H.G. Boggs, Florida Real Estate Brokerage and Agency Law (1990)(Copies
available from the Florida Real Estate Commission).
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"fiduciary duty," and understanding this duty is at the heart
of understanding agency. Basically, the fiduciary duty re-
quires the agent to serve the principal loyally and faithfully
within the agency relationship. This means that, if necessary,
the agent must put his or her own interests (whether financial
or otherwise) second in importance to the interests of the
principal where the agency relationship is concerned."
IV. AGENCY LAW AND REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
A basic and fundamental function of a real estate broker is to
bring the buyer and seller together. Because the real estate market-
place is generally local in nature and does not have a national stock
or commodities exchange to help buyers and sellers find each other,
the role of the broker is very useful.
Brokers often create the agency relationship with the seller
pursuant to a listing agreement. Brokers are free to form agency
relations with either buyers or sellers as long as the applicable
requirements of law are satisfied. If a listing contract and agency
relationship between the broker and seller are secured, the broker
should try to sell the property subject to the listing terms. Deviation
from the terms is possible but any changes must be approved by the
seller. Even though several different types of listing contracts are
used in the brokerage business, once the broker is the seller's agent,
then he or she should try to advance the seller's interests using the
legal means available. The broker should safeguard the seller's
interests by following legal instructions and by keeping the seller
informed regarding any transactions. Most brokers also have
licensed salespeople associated with them. This three party relation-
ship between the broker, the salesperson and the principal deserves
special attention.
" Id at 1.
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V. BROKERS AND SALESPERSONS
Most states require that both real estate brokers and salespeople
be licensed by the state before handling any sale transactions. Unless
an exception applies, a salesperson will be affiliated with a broker.
Generally, salespeople are hired as independent contractors or they
are employed by their brokers. In either case, it is helpful to analyze
the relationship between the salesperson and the broker's principal.
Primarily, the broker and not the salesperson, is directly related
to the principal as agent. Even if the salesperson deals personally
with the seller (assuming the more usual scenario where the seller,
not the buyer, is the principal) and negotiates the listing contract, the
agency relationship typically goes through the broker in order to
reach the salesperson. This does not mean that the listing broker's
salesperson has no obligations to the seller. On the contrary, the
listing broker's salesperson, like the broker, owes a fiduciary duty of
loyalty and service to the broker's principal. From a legal stand-
point, however, the salesperson's agency connection to the principal
normally goes through the broker.
VI. THE LISTING BROKER AND OTHER BROKERS
While it is true that the listing broker sometimes finds the buyer
for the listed property, it is more likely that another brokerage firm,
separate from the listing broker, will locate a buyer. Tie widespread
use and operation of the multiple listing service (MLS) concept
contributes to this fact.12 Significant questions arise regarding the
12 A multiple listing service is typically an arrangement in which member brokers share
listing information. The following quotation from Florida Real Estate Brokerage and
Agency Law explains the concept.
To understand how a multiple listing service works, imagine that you are seated
in a room with 25 or 30 other persons. Pretend that each is a licensed real estate
broker in your community actively operating a brokerage business in competition
with each other. Further imagine that a potential buyer walks into your office
looking for a three bedroom, two bath house, in the northeastarea of town, priced
at about $95,000. Naturally, you check the listings of houses for sale in your
office to see if there is anything similar to the house wanted by the buyer. If
there is, great. You would then show the buyer the property, hope he or she likes
it, and try to sell it. On the other hand, if you don't have anything in your listings
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status of the nonlisting broker or "selling broker" who brings the
buyer to the transaction. In most cases, the selling broker makes a
separate agreement with the listing broker to share the listing
broker's commission (which is paid by the seller) if the purchaser
procured by the selling broker completes the transaction.
Notice that in this example the selling broker does not deal with
the seller but goes directly through the listing broker. The selling
broker is unlikely to contact the seller directly if the listing broker
has either an "exclusive" or an "exclusive-right-to-sell" listing
contract with the owner. This type of listing typically grants the
listing broker a commission if a sale occurs during the listing period
even if another broker procures the sale. In either case, if the listing
broker is going to receive a commission from the seller, even though
the selling broker created the sale, the selling broker's financial and
practical incentives suggest that she maintain contact and cooperate
with the listing broker. 3
which might appeal to the buyer, what would you do?
Obviously, if you knew what the other brokers in your area had listed in their
offices, maybe there would be something for sale which matched your buyer's
needs. At this point, the simple genius of the multiple listing service becomes
apparent. Think what would happen if all the brokers in the community shared
their listing information. Now you might be able to match your buyer's needs
with a house that is for sale, and you and the listing broker could share the
commission. From your standpoint, the opportunity to close a sale, even though
you only share the commission, appears to be much better than the position you
were previously in when no sale seemed possible because you had no listings of
your own which interested the buyer. The same logic also applies to the position
of the listing broker if he or she has no potential buyers for the listing. More
importantly, both the buyer and seller can benefit from the operation of the
multiple listing service since they may now have the opportunity to complete a
transaction which might not otherwise have occurred without the exchange of
listing information made possible by the service.
Id. at 4-5.
13 Theoretically, at least, the selling broker could contact the seller directly and
attempt to bypass the listing broker. This may mean that the selling broker acquires a full
commission from the seller, but could leave the seller legally obligated to pay two
commissions, one to the listing broker under the listing and one to the selling broker
pursuant to a sales contract clause provided by the selling broker. This result would
probably lead to a very dissatisfied seller and could easily end up in litigation. Also, if the
selling broker belongs to the MLS, he or she may have contractually given up the right to
attempt to bypass the listing broker if an MLS is used.
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How, under these circumstances, should the courts construe the
agency relationship between the selling broker, the seller, and the
buyer? As previously noted, authorities confronted with this problem
have often concluded in the past that the selling broker is considered
to be a subagent of the listing broker and, therefore, the selling
broker's principal is the seller. 14 It is also clear that the selling
broker is not absolutely required to be a subagent of the listing
broker and may take steps to thwart the subagency relationship, even
in states where the general rule applies. 5
If the latter were the case, the selling broker would take the
position that his or her preferred role is as the buyer's agent.
Therefore, the selling broker should clearly apprise both the listing
broker and the seller of this fact to avoid inadvertently creating an
agency relationship with the seller. Otherwise, the selling broker
could end up in a dual agency situation, owing a fiduciary duty to
both the buyer and the seller. Although dual agencies are not illegal
per se, the broker must give full and complete disclosure to both
principals and receive their informed consent to the arrangement.'6
Conversely, if the selling broker is content to be a subagent of
the listing broker, then steps should be taken to prevent the buyer
from developing an agency relationship with the selling broker,
unless a dual agency is contemplated. To achieve this goal the
selling broker should fully disclose this agency relationship to the
buyer at an early point in the selling broker's contact with the buyer.
In many states, real estate licensees are required to make full
disclosure of their principal's identity to the other party in the
transaction. 7
Once the selling broker has established a subagency relationship
with the seller through the listing broker, or alternatively, an agency
relationship with the buyer, and has taken steps to insure that no
agency relationship develops with the opposite party, then the
position of any salesperson associated with the selling broker should
1 John W. Reilly, Agency Relationships in Real Estate, REAL ESTATE EDUCATION
COMPANY, 35-38, 167 (1987). See also, Matthew M. Collette, Subagency in Residential
Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle with Reality, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
399, 403 (1988).
is Id.
16 Id. at 62-65.
17 See supra, note 7.
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be considered. As with the listing broker, it is the selling broker, not
the selling broker's salesperson, who has the more direct agency
relationship to the principal. As before, the broker links the selling
broker's salesperson to the principal. The salespeople continue to
have the fiduciary duty to the principal just as their broker does. To
summarize, if the selling broker is a subagent of the listing broker,
then the agency relationship would run from the seller to the listing
broker and then to the selling broker.
Determination of the identity of a real estate broker's principal is
far from an academic exercise. To illustrate, consider the facts of a
recent Arkansas case Fennell v. Ross."8 In this litigation, the
buyers, a veterinarian and his wife, were looking for a site where he
could set up his office and veterinary practice. The sellers contracted
with the listing broker who in turn placed a reference to the property
in the MLS publication. This information included a statement
which said the property had "Commercial Potential! Any type
business!"19  Meanwhile, the buyers had been working with a
salesperson from another brokerage firm for some months. Although
the property was currently zoned residential, this salesperson
"assured" the buyers that "they would have no trouble getting the
zoning changed." 20
Unfortunately, the property was located in the "100 year flood
plain" and the trial court found that the salesperson making "assur-
ances" to the buyers knew about the flood plain facts.21 After the
buyers signed a binding contract, but before the closing, the buyers
learned about the flood plain problem. They were advised by city
employees that "rezoning would be very difficult to obtain, 22 and
therefore, the buyers refused to close the transaction. When sued by
the sellers for breach of contract, the buyers contended that the
failure of the sellers and the seller's real estate agents to disclose the
flood plain information resulted in a legal right for the buyers to
avoid the contract and receive their deposit money.
is 711 S.W.2d 793 (Ark. 1986).
19 Id. at 794.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 795.
2 Id.
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The trial judge agreed with the buyers' argument ruling that the
flood plain information and development restrictions should be
legally characterized as a material fact and that the sellers should
have disclosed this to the buyers.23 Still the trial court did not grant
the buyers relief because the court ruled that the salespeople who had
been showing property to the buyers for months knew about the
flood plain situation; and since this other salesperson was also
implicitly the buyers' agent, this knowledge was legally imputed to
the buyers.24
The sellers won at the trial level and the buyers appealed. On
review, the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge,
except for one key fact. The appellate court focused on the determi-
native issue of whether the "selling" agent was legally the buyers'
agent or, the sellers' agent. The court discussed the MLS situation,
cited a law review article, and reviewed precedent from other states.
Finally, the court reversed the trial judge and ruled that "in an MLS
transaction like this one" the salesperson who had shown the buyers
property for months was a "subagent of the sellers. 25
In essence, the salesperson's knowledge concerning the flood
plain could not be "imputed" to the buyers because the salesperson
was no longer the buyers' agent. Accordingly, the case was
remanded.
The Fennell v. Ross case illustrates the fact that important legal
consequences in a particular transaction can be determined by agency
relationship decisions. Therefore, it behooves the real estate broker
or salesperson to initially determine under applicable state law who
is her principal and then to behave accordingly.
VII. SUBAGENCY PROFILED
At this point the legal effect of a selling broker embracing a
subagency relationship to the seller through the listing broker should
be relatively well understood. Taken in the abstract, the legal logic
producing the subagency concept is not unreasonable. The Fennell
2 Id.
2 Id. at 794-795.
25 Id. at 796.
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court cited a 1978 law review article that explained the logic pattern
as follows:
[Tihe agency relationship is usually established between the
seller and the listing agent through the listing contract, an
agreement that acts as an employment contract for the listing
agent. An agency relationship between the seller and the
selling broker is often created by express language in the
listing agreement. The clause that creates this agency
relationship expressly authorizes or requires the listing agent
to utilize the services of other brokers as subagents. There-
fore, any broker who is not the listing broker but is attempt-
ing to effect a sale of the property in cooperation with the
listing agent is considered a subagent. Consequently, when
the listing contract contains such a provision, the selling
broker has the duties of agency imposed upon him as a
subagent of the listing broker .... 26
This analysis, concluding that the selling broker is a subagent
(with a fiduciary duty to the seller) makes sense. However, this
result is not without its deficiencies. In the law review article cited
in Fennell, the author also stated:
This subagency relationship with the seller, which generally
precludes an agency relationship with the buyer, seems to be
ignored by, if not unknown to, many selling agents. In
addition, most buyers are probably unaware of its existence
much less its legal ramifications. In practice, if the selling
broker ever meets the seller, it is usually either when showing
the property to a prospective purchaser or upon presentation
of a purchase offer to the seller. However, the selling
broker's relationship with the buyer is quite different. Often,
the broker has been in the company of the purchaser for
many hours and has conducted some fairly confidential
interviews with the prospective purchaser. Given such
Id. at 795, 796 (citing, Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability:
Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 767, 771-773 (1978))
(footnotes omitted).
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extensive contact with the buyer, and such minimal contact
with the seller, the buyer is justified in believing that the
agent will do his best to obtain the property for the buyer at
the lowest possible price and on the most advantageous terms.
Of course, for the agents to attempt to do so is a violation of
the agent's duty to the seller. However, it would be unrealis-
tic to expect the buyer to feel that a broker who has worked
with him extensively is attempting to obtain the highest
possible price for the seller, which, in actuality, is the agent's
duty.27
This observation of the reality of the selling broker's situation in
a subagency correctly focuses on the attitudes and reasonable
expectations of the parties. Does it really make sense to require a
broker who spends weeks or even months working with a buyer to
set aside that actual relationship in favor of a fiduciary duty to a
seller who the broker probably did not meet? Add to that question
the fact that the seller already has the listing broker under a fiduciary
obligation and when the selling broker is also legally bound to the
seller as a subagent, the buyer is left without the benefit of fiduciary
duties from either broker. On balance, the legal result of seller
subagency does not fit very well with the actual personal relation-
ships found in the marketplace, nor does it satisfy the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
Some states, like Alabama and Colorado, have made a factual
analysis on a case by case basis to determine whether a selling
broker is the seller's agent or the buyer's agent. Other states, like
Arizona, have concluded that a selling broker is more properly
characterized as the buyer's agent.n
Naturally, rules such as these are subject to change and interested
parties must check for current case decisions or other changes in law
in these and other states. Also, contractual agreements between the
parties can affect whether the selling broker is legally an agent of the
seller or of the buyer. In addition, in early 1992, the National
27 711 S.W.2d 793 (Ark. 1986) (citing Romero) (footnotes omitted).
2 For the Alabama Rule see Cahhion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1977). For
the Colorado Rule, see Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987). For the
Arizona rule, see Buffington v. Haas. 601 P.2d 1320 (Ariz. 1979).
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Association of Realtors released a report designed in part to
minimize confusion regarding agency relationships between brokers
and principals. 9 Implementation of changes contemplated in this
report, especially in the operation of MLS systems should lead
brokers to more clearly identify their principal in a transaction.
A. Duties to the Principal
At this point, consideration should be given to the specific nature
of the duties a real estate licensee owes to both the principal and to
the nonprincipal in an agency relationship. Once an agency
relationship is established, the principal has a right to expect the
agent to behave along the lines defined by the traditional concepts of
fiduciary duty. Historically, words such as loyalty, trustworthiness,
and honesty were used to describe a fiduciary duty. Obedience plays
a role, too, because the agent should obey all lawful instructions
given by the principal within the scope of the agency. Basically, a
good rule of thumb is that the agent should advance the principal's
interests using lawful means. If the agent's and principal's interests
conflict, then the principal must receive priority in agency matters.
The following quotations from selected court decisions show the
flavor and judicial gloss which courts might use when describing the
duties a real estate licensee owes to his or her principal in an agency
relationship.
In Quinn v. Phipps, the Florida Supreme Court stated, "[h]e is the
agent of his principal in every sense, and, when that relation is
undertaken, a fiduciary relation is created which bars the agent from
becoming interested in the business or property antagonistic to his
principal without his knowledge or consent."3 Later, in MacGregor
v. Florida Real Estate Commission, the court held,
[Tihat in the relationship of a real estate broker to his
principal, ... appellant, was under the duty of informing his
principal of any circumstance that might reasonably be
expected to influence the complete loyalty of the agent to the
2 National Association of Realtors Report of the Presidential Advisory Group on
Agency, March, 1992.
30 113 So. 2d 419, 425 (Fla. 1927).
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interest of his principal, or that might reasonably be expected
to influence his principal in the negotiation.
31
Still, in Hershey v. Keyes Company, the court ruled that "[any
concealment from the principal of material facts known to the agent
will forfeit the agent's right to compensation for his services.' 32
Once the concept of the fiduciary duty is clear, it is then time for
a more detailed consideration of the duties an agent owes to the
parties opposite from the agent's principal in the transaction. It is
here that the application of agency law to real estate brokerage may
vary more from state to state.
It will soon be apparent that describing the approaches taken by
various jurisdictions regarding a real estate licensee's duties to the
nonprincipal is considerably more complex than formulating a
general rule concerning duties to the principal. Yet it is in this area
that much confusion and misunderstanding exists and it is here that
much work remains to be done. Nevertheless, before discussing an
agent's duties to nonprincipals, brief mention should be made of the
concept of dual agency.
B. Dual Agency
Dual agency occurs where a broker has two principals at the
same time and the principals have adverse interests. Since the broker
is the agent of both, they are both owed a fiduciary duty. This
situation is normally permissible only upon full and complete
disclosure to both principals, and upon an informed consent by both
parties to the dual agency.
Dual agency representation has many potential pitfalls for real
estate agents. Often it will be impossible to simultaneously honor
the fiduciary duties to both parties and withdrawal from the transac-
tion may become necessary. Licensees may find it expedient not to
enter intentional dual agencies except under extreme or unusual
circumstances, and even then, only after advice of legal counsel. It
is also important for licensees to avoid the trap of falling into an
unintentional dual agency by allowing an agency relationship to
31 99 So. 2d 709. 712 (Fla. 1958).
1- 209 So. 2d 240. 243 (Fla. 1968).
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develop with both buyer and seller. Many negative consequences
can flow from a dual agency when the principals do not give an
informed consent after full disclosure.
Even with appropriate consent and disclosure, a dual agency is
hazardous for licensees since it is often very difficult, or perhaps
impossible, to be loyal to both buyer and seller and advance each of
their interests simultaneously. A minority rule applicable in at least
one state simply prohibits real estate licensees from engaging in dual
agencies altogether.33
VIII. DUTIES TO THE NONPRINCIPAL
A difficult question to be resolved in the area of real estate
brokerage and agency law is how a broker or salesperson must treat
the party who is opposite from the principal. For example, in
Florida, as in many other states, courts impose minimum standards
of conduct on brokers and salespeople for dealing with a nonprin-
cipal. The Florida rule can be traced back to Zichlin v. Dill.' In
Zichlin, the Florida Supreme Court held nonprincipals could expect
that real estate licensees would operate with at least "[t]he requisites
of an honest, ethical man."35 The court disregarded the old rule of
"let the buyer beware" and created this new duty because real estate
brokers were licensed and regulated by the state under a "high
standard of qualifications."36 In subsequent cases, since 1946,
Florida courts continue to adhere to the rule announced in Zichlin.
The facts of each new case paint a picture of what is an "honest,
ethical man." The rule, however, is somewhat elastic and a real
estate licensee's conduct is judicially deemed to be proper or
improper on an ad hoc basis. More modem cases tend to describe
acceptable broker or salesperson conduct as meeting an obligation of
honesty, candor, and fair dealing toward the nonprincipal.37
33 See, e.g., Proctor v. Holden, 540 A.2d 133 (Md. App. 1988).
S25 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1946).
35 Id. at 5.
3 Id. at 4-5.
37 See, e.g., Gerber v. The Keyes Co., 443 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Ellis v. Flink, 301 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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In addition to lawsuits based on a breach of the duty of honesty,
candor, and fair-dealing, nonprincipals may also file civil fraud suits
against brokers and salespersons representing the opposite party. It
is fair to state that a real estate licensee guilty of civil fraud would
not be acting as "an honest, ethical man," and would be breaching
the duty of honesty, candor, and fairness, as well.
What is probably not well known, however, is that in some states
civil fraud can be proven by facts and circumstances other than an
intentional false statement concerning the transaction. The Florida
Supreme Court expressed this rule of law in Joiner v. McCullers:
A false representation of a material fact, made with knowl-
edge of its falsity, to a person ignorant thereof, with intention
that [it] shall be acted upon, followed by reliance upon and
by action thereon amounting to substantial change of position,
is a fraud of which the law will take cognizance.3"
There is no difficulty with the notion that real estate brokers
should be held legally accountable if and when they make a false
statement of material fact about a transaction with "knowledge of the
falsity." Clearly, the duty of honesty, candor, and fairness to the
nonprincipal would be breached by such behavior. The Florida
Supreme Court, however, did not limit the prospect liability to only
intentional conduct of this type. The court further explained that the
criteria of "knowledge of falsity" could be established in two
additional ways, besides actual knowledge.39 These are that the
false statement was made: (a) "Without knowledge of its truth or
falsity," or (b) "under circumstances in which the person making it
ought to have known, if he did not know, of its falsity."' The court
articulated this rule by stating that category (a) could be satisfied by
showing that the speaker stated an "absolute, unqualified, and
positive assertion on a subject of which he was ignorant, and that he
had no knowledge whether his assertion in reference thereto was true
or false;"4 and that category (b) could be satisfied by showing that
38 Joiner v. McCullers, 28 So. 2d 823. 824 (Fla. 1947).
39 Id.
40 Id. (emphasis added).
41 Id.
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the speaker, "occupied such a special situation or possessed such
means of knowledge as made it his duty to know as to the truth or
falsity of the representation made. 4
2
Based on these principles of law, it seems clear that a real estate
broker or salesperson could be legally liable to the nonprincipal by
making an unintentional mistake about a material fact concerning the
property. Whether the courts assess liability depends on whether the
facts of a particular case demonstrate that the broker or salesperson
recklessly made the false statement (category (a)) or whether the
broker's or salesperson's "position" in the transaction causes the
court to impose a "duty" on the broker or salesperson to know the
truth (category (b)). Moreover, in each of these situations, liability
only attaches if the false statement is about a "material" fact.
Generally speaking, the courts consider a material fact to be an
important fact regarding the transaction and not what is generally
mere "sales talk." The courts also refer to "sales talk" as "puffery"
or "mere puffery" and statements of this nature would normally be
outside the realm of material facts. Examples of sales talk would
probably include: "Isn't this backyard just beautiful! You'll never
get tired of this view!" or "This house would be wonderful to live
in." Although the line of demarcation between sales talk and
statements of material fact is a fine one, brokers representing sellers
are, after all, in the business of selling real estate and, accordingly,
some latitude in extolling a property's virtue is allowed without
liability unless the statements are false and relate to material facts.
Thus, unintentional false statements of material fact should result in
liability if the court applies caselaw like that used in Florida.43
42 Id. (citation omitted).
43 See Boggs, supra note 10. Florida Real Estate Brokerage and Agency Law
explains this problem.
Things get somewhat more difficult to sort out when the broker makes statements about the
property which he or she believes to be true, but which actually are not. Examples of these
kinds of statements are almost limitless but certainly would include things like: (1) This
house is hooked up to the sewer line (but it really is on a septic tank); (2) The lot is 100
ft. x 300 ft. (when it really is 85 ft. x 300 ft.); or (3) This roof is watertight (when it
actually leaks). Remember that in each of these cases the real estate licensee making the
statement truly believes that his or her information is correct, and therefore, at least
arguably, has not violated the duty of honesty, candor, and fairness to the buyer.
On the other hand, look at the position of the buyer. If he buys because of the broker's
incorrect statements, his actual damages are not reduced simply because the broker did not
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intend to make a false statement. So, the real question at law is: When should a broker (or
salesman) have to pay money damages to the buyer or receive disciplinary penalties from
the Real Estate Commission when he or she makes unintentional, untrue statements of
material fact about the seller's property to the buyer. One class of cases like this can be
dealt with quickly and easily. If the broker is reckless in making statements of material fact
about the property, then most Florida courts would probably let the buyer recover damages.
The term reckless, as used here, generally means that the licensee made the statements
without caring whether they were true or false. and generally, he or she has no basis to
support the statements made. An honest, ethical person would not behave this way, and this
kind of behavior would not constitute fair dealing with the buyer.
Once cases involving unintentional, untrue statements of material fact made recklessly
are disposed of, a large number of factual situations are left where line drawing is very
difficult. Traditionally, Florida courts have been reluctant to hold brokers financially liable
to buyers when unintentional false statements of material fact were made without
recklessness, and under circumstances where a reasonably diligent broker should not have
known about the falsity.
For example, in 1978, Bauer v. Vanguard Realty, Inc., 365 So. 2d 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) decided that a broker would not be liable to a buyer because of the broker's
failure to correctly state the square footage of a house. The facts are fairly simple and
straight-forward. The broker was the agent of the seller. The broker's listing said the house
had 1,980 square feet. The buyer alleged that the broker verbally said that the house had
"just under 2,000 square feet." The buyer further alleged that the house actually had 1,837
square feet in it, but failed to allege that this discrepancy was a material fact causing him
to contract to purchase the house. The appellate court agreed with the trial court judge who
said,
Florida courts have consistently put a burden upon the purchasers to ascertain for them-
selves those facts which are easily ascertainable. The gross square footage of a home is
such an easily ascertainable fact that strict reliance on a representation by a broker can be
misplaced. (emphasis added) Id. at 197.
In 1985, a similar case, Miller v. Sullivan, 475 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
the facts were fairly simple. The seller placed property for sale with a listing broker. The
listing broker stated that the house had 1,417 square feet in both the listing agreement and
the multiple listing service book. The buyer alleged that he bought the house relying on this
information and also relying on an alleged statement by the selling broker that the 1,417
square feet was "heated and cooled area." Later, after purchasing, the buyer learned that
his house actually contained only 1,092 square feet, and he sued the brokers and the seller.
Predictably, the court said that for the buyer to prove that the listing broker was
negligent, the buyer would have to prove that the listing broker breached the duty of
"honesty, candor, and fair dealing." Id. at 1011 (citation omitted). In a departure from the
holding of the other appellate court in 1978, this court now said that there was "a dispute"
about whether a listing broker "had a duty to double-check by measuring the square footage
figure" given by the seller. Id. at 1012. This, along with some other disputed matters,
caused the court to send the case back to the trial level for further proceedings.
Compare the two cases just discussed. In 1985, a Florida appellate court, faced with
an apparently unintentional, false statement made by a broker about the square footage of
a house, sent the matter to trial rather than dismiss the buyer's claims without a trial, as had
been done before in 1978. Can this difference be explained because the 1985 court felt that
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The problem, at least from the broker's point of view, is that this
area of the law is dynamic and the legal consequences of making an
unintentional false statement to the nonprincipal about a material fact
can expand as the court articulates new decisions. A good illustra-
tion of this is the issue of whether a broker or salesperson has a duty
to double-check the accuracy of factual information produced by the
principal."4
At this stage, it appears that brokers and salespersons in many
states face the very real prospect of being personally liable for
communicating unintentional errors regarding material facts of a
transaction to the nonprincipal. This is true when the broker merely
repeats information originating from the principal even when the
broker has no reason to doubt the veracity of the principal's
comments. If courts continue along the trends indicated by current
case law, the role of the broker will effectively be transformed from
that of a salesperson to an insurer of the accuracy of material facts
concerning a transaction whenever the broker or salesperson
communicates information. This could include advertising materials
and MLS data. For example, the selling broker owing a fiduciary
even though the listing broker did not intend to make a false statement, and apparently was
not reckless, nevertheless a trial might decide that a broker in the position of the listing
broker should have determined the true square footage in spite of what the seller told him?
If this is true, do Florida brokers and salesmen who are agents of the seller now have a duty
to double-check facts told to them by the seller before passing this information along to the
buyer?
Consider the outcome of a Florida case which went to trial in early 1989. The buyers
complained that the broker, who was the seller's agent, incorrectly stated the zoning of the
property. The buyers learned the true zoning only after the closing and argued that the
broker and the seller should be liable because they could not use the property for their
intended purpose.
The broker (and salesman) argued that they had only repeated the zoning status given
to them by the sellers (although the sellers disputed this). It is important to take note of two
of the instructions given by the judge to the jury to guide them in reaching their verdict.
Again predictably, the court said the broker (and salesman) owed the buyer a duty of
honesty, candor, and fair dealing. But the judge went further by adding in another
instruction that the broker (and salesman) also, "have a statutory duty to be competent and
qualified to make real estate transaction(s) and conduct negotiations therefore with safety
to investors and to those with whom he may undertake a relationship of trust and
confidence" (quoting FLA. STAT. § 475.17(l)(a) (1991)).
When the jury returned, they found liability for money damages against both the sellers
and the broker, although a much larger amount was lodged against the sellers. Id.
4 See Boggs, supra note 43.
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and MLS data. For example, the selling broker owing a fiduciary
duty to the seller can be liable to the buyer for incorrect material
facts passed on to the buyer from the MLS data compiled by the
listing broker. If the selling broker becomes liable to the buyer in a
situation like this, the selling broker may seek indemnification from
the listing broker. This, however, may be a fruitless act if the listing
broker is insolvent or uninsured.
A. Duty to Inspect
Some states have gone further regarding duties brokers and
salespersons owe to the nonprincipal than the results of the cases just
discussed. One widely cited case in this area is Easton v.
Strassburger,45 decided in California in 1984. In that case, the
court found the listing broker liable to the buyer on a theory of negli-
gence.'
The facts involve buyers purchasing a residence for $170,000,
with the involvement of a selling (or cooperating) broker in the
transaction. After the closing, severe earth slides occurred and badly
damaged the house. The property value "was estimated to be as low
as $20,000.00. '4 7 Although the sellers knew that there had been
earth slides before the property was listed for sale, they did not tell
the listing broker or salesperson anything about this problem.
48
First the court recounted the California rule requiring the listing
broker to tell the buyer about this material defect if they had known
about it. Then the court addressed the main issue of the case;
whether the listing broker owed the buyer a duty "to disclose defects
which he should have discovered through reasonable diligence.
49
After discussing this point thoroughly, the court held:
In sum, we hold that the duty of a real estate broker, repre-
senting the seller, to disclose facts ... includes the affirma-
tive duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent
45 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
46 Id. at 385.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 386.
49 Id. at 387.
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inspection of the residential property listed for sale and to
disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affect-
ing the value or desirability of the property that such an
investigation would reveal.50
The court affirmed the finding of liability against the listing broker
because the "soil stability" of the property was not tested and the
broker was aware of certain so-called "red flags" which "should have
indicated to them that there were soil problems."5
The listing broker, who was legally the seller's agent, failed to
arrange a soil test designed to benefit the buyer, and the California
court concluded that this conduct was a negligent breach of duty to
the buyer, the broker's nonprincipal. It should also be noted that a
listing broker in this situation may well have a viable cause of action
against the seller if the facts of the case show the seller's conceal-
ment of material facts related to the property's defects. However,
this may or may not do the listing broker any practical good
depending on the solvency of the seller. In a subsequent 1988
California case Smith v. Richard,52 the court followed the rule of
Easton yet made it clear that the listing broker's affirmative duty to
inspect for the buyer's benefit included only residential property and
not commercial property.53
California is not alone in imposing a duty on listing brokers to
protect residential buyers through affirmative inspections. In the
New Mexico case of Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial
Center, Inc., a buyer working with a selling broker brought suit
against the listing broker based on alleged misrepresentations in the
"computer listing sheet" which the listing broker prepared.55 The
appellate court reviewing this matter stated, "[u]nder some circum-
stances, a broker may have a duty to disclose defects that an
inspection would reveal. 56 The court then cited Easton as authority
to undergird its position.
50 Id at 390 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
51 Id at 386.
52 254 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
53 Id at 638.
5 686 P.2d 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
53 Id at 265.
6 Id at 266.
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Likewise, courts in Washington held that listing brokers may owe
buyers certain duties regarding affirmative inspections of the listed
property. In McRae v. Bolstad," a disappointed buyer brought suit
against the listing broker because of drainage and sewage problems
the buyer experienced at the fiewly-purchased residence. First, the
reviewing court applied the state's Consumer Protection Act to the
transaction. Then, the court disposed of disputes surrounding the
trial judge's jury instructions, stating:
It is argued that instruction 6 purports to place an affirmative
duty to use care to ascertain the condition of real property
before listing it .... Court's instruction 12 properly states
that a real estate broker must exercise that degree of care that
a reasonably prudent real estate broker would use under all
the circumstances .... 58
In the sale of real estate, a broker or seller has a duty to
disclose all material facts not reasonably ascertainable to the
buyer. Failure to disclose a material fact, where there is a
duty to disclose is fraudulent.59
Since this Washington case was decided before the California
decision in Easton, no reference was made to the California rule.
Nevertheless, the Washington court's decision and the language
articulated appears to place the law in Washington in a posture
similar to that of California's law.
Courts in jurisdictions like these place a heavy burden on real
estate licensees. Remember that the listing broker is, almost without
exception, considered to be the seller's legal agent. The listing
broker therefore owes a fiduciary duty to the seller, her principal
under agency law. These kinds of court decisions thrust confusion
into that well-defined relationship. Thus, the broker's incentive is to
approach the principal and tell her that the premises must be
affirmatively inspected to search out possible material defects. If
found, these defects must be reported to potential buyers.
5 646 P.2d 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
58 Id. at 775.
59 Id. at 774.
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How do most sellers react to this? Are they offended? Do they
wonder who the broker is really working for? Clearly this situation
is unlikely to enhance the relationship of trust and confidence
between sellers and their real estate agents. One has to wonder if
this is good public policy, or if perhaps it would be better to place
the responsibility for inspecting property on those who have
traditionally borne it, buyers or their agents.
B. The Slippery Slope
After the California court decision in Easton, the state completely
embraced the concepts regarding listing broker inspections. Presum-
ably with the goal of protecting residential real estate buyers, the
California Legislature codified the holding of Easton into the state's
statutes in 1985.60 The Legislature noted that its intent in adopting
the statute was to clarify the duties owed by brokers to facilitate the
ready availability of professional liability insurance coverage for real
estate licensees.6' In any event, the California Civil Code then
provided, in part:
It is the duty of a real estate broker ... to a prospective
purchaser of residential real property ... to conduct a
reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the
property offered for sale and to disclose to that prospective
purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirabili-
ty of the property that such an investigation would reveal, if
that broker has a written contract with the seller to find or
obtain a buyer or is a broker who acts in cooperation with
such a broker to find and obtain a buyer.62
The language of the statute makes clear that the duty of inspecting
residential real estate for the buyer's benefit binds not only the listing
broker, but also the selling broker. The statutory language appears
to be based on the usual scenario in which the listing broker and the
60 Cal. Stat. ch. 223 (1985); Civil Code § 2079.
61 Id
62 I
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selling broker are agent and subagent of the seller, respectively, and
both owe a fiduciary duty to the seller under agency law principles.
Unfortunately, both the Easton decision and the statute failed to
address the question of how to successfully integrate a broker
representing the buyer into a residential real estate transaction.
Easton discussed in considerable lengths the plight of most residen-
tial buyers who do not appreciate the notion that both the listing
broker and the selling broker are normally agents of the seller. 3
Since the Easton court felt that many buyers 'justifiably believe the
seller's broker is also protecting their interest,"' the court also
found it reasonable and logical to place the burden on the seller's
brokers. However, the court failed to anticipate what would happen
when a bona fide buyer's broker was part of the transaction.
That situation subsequently arose in California and presented the
courts with the interesting challenge of resolution. In the 1989
decision of Murray v. Hayden,65 the court heard the claims of a
disappointed residential purchaser who allegedly "suffered damages
as a result of concealed defects in a single family residence they
purchased."'' Ironically, the alleged defects of the house in
Murray, like those in the Easton case, related to soil conditions and
foundation problems causing the buyers to complain about "cracks,
distress, and deterioration." 67  Like the plaintiffs in Easton, the
buyers in Murray brought suit naming the sellers and the brokers.
Unlike Easton, however, the buyers in Murray also sued a real
estate licensee who was their own agent." This individual asked
the trial court to dismiss him from the case. The trial court agreed
finding "no duty on the part of Hayden, acting as the buyer's broker,
to conduct an inspection."6 9
When the buyers appealed, the appellate court characterized their
claim as one seeking "to extend the holding in Easton to include a
duty on the part of the real estate broker representing the buyer to
63 Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388-389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
6 Id at 389 (emphasis added).
65 259 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
6 d at 257.
67 Id.
6 Id. at 258-259.
69 Id. at 258.
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conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection."7  The
court analyzed this issue in light of the facts and referred to both the
Easton precedent and the applicable statute. In the end, the court
apparently based its decision on a desire to avoid duplication of
inspection duties in the brokerage industry. The court stated:
In the final analysis, we can find no compelling reason for
extending the duty to conduct an inspection to a broker
representing the buyer.... The seller's broker is in a better
position to conduct an inspection, and there would be a
duplication of effort were such a duty imposed on the buyer's
broker.71
When the results of the Easton decision, its subsequent codifica-
tion, and the Murray decision are viewed together, a rather surprising
picture emerges. Real estate licensees who were the legal agents of
the seller were under obligations to conduct inspections for the
benefit of the buyer. Real estate licensees who were legal agents of
the buyer were relieved from obligations to inspect the premises for
the benefit of their principals. This result was unfortunate at best
and ridiculous at worst. Perhaps the Murray court should not be
blamed too vigorously; it probably did not want to upset the Easton
precedent or attack the relevant statute. This decision in California
can be blamed on the ad hoc, piecemeal approach to decision
making. A state which adopts a comprehensive real estate bro-
kerage/agency statute might avoid circumstances such as those.
C. Intentional Misrepresentation
Similar to the case law previously discussed, a great majority of
states hold real estate licensees liable to those who can prove that the
licensee engaged in an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact
in the transaction. Holding real estate brokers and salespersons to a
standard of honesty and truthfulness in their dealings seems entirely
reasonable. The brokerage business should not tolerate those who
70 Id
71 Id. at 259.
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willfully engage in fabrications in order to make a sale, and both
disciplinary sanctions and civil liability should attach to licensees
engaged in such conduct. Sometimes even criminal liability is
appropriate for willful fraud.
Although a general consensus exists proscribing willful lying
about material facts by real estate licensees, what about the licensee
who just keeps quiet about a material defect regarding the property
being sold?
D. Duty to Disclose
It was long the rule under the old legal concept of caveat emptor
that real estate sellers did not have a duty to speak up and disclose
material defects unless questioned by the buyer. In a 1985 landmark
case, Johnson v. Davis,2 the Florida Supreme Court abruptly
changed this rule. After considering the history and judicial
construction of the caveat emptor doctrine, the Florida court looked
to other states to see how they approached this problem. The court
first referred to a California decision which required sellers to
disclose material defects unknown to and not readily discernible by
the buyer. The court then cited similar precedents from several other
jurisdictions and concluded that Florida law on this point should be
changed. The court stated:
Accordingly, we hold that where the seller of a home knows
of facts materially affecting the value of the property which
are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer,
the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer. This
duty is equally applicable to all forms of real property, new
and used.73
In subsequent appellate court decisions since Johnson v. Davis,
the duty to disclose assigned to sellers in that case has been extended
to real estate brokers representing the seller.74 The duty imposed
on Florida real estate brokers representing sellers to treat buyers
72 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
73 Id. at 629.
74 See, e.g., Rayner v. Wise Realty Co., 504 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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fairly, honestly, and candidly now includes a duty to disclose
material defects not known to or readily observable by those buyers.
Florida is not alone in requiring real estate licensees to disclose these
kinds of material defects; a minority of states now have a rule
substantially similar to Florida law.
E. Negligent Misrepresentation
Expressing a general rule when examining negligent misrepresen-
tation by a real estate licensee to the nonprincipal is much more
difficult than formulating a general rule for intentional misrepresenta-
tion. The Florida rule on this point was explained earlier when
considering Joiner v. McCullers.75 Recall that Florida courts can
hold the licensee liable for unintentional misrepresentations if they
were made either (1) not knowing whether the statement was true or
false, or (2) when the speaker should have known the truth. This is
an area of developing and uncertain case law in which the decisions
are very fact specific. Other states are also wrestling with these
same issues.
For example, consider Alaska. In the 1982 case Bevins v.
Ballard, a dissatisfied buyer sued the sellers, their listing broker and
the broker's salesperson.76 The buyer purchased a lot with an
unfinished house supplied with well water. The salesperson told the
buyer the well was "good" and the trial court found that this
information originated with the sellers. 77 Unfortunately, the well
was not "good" and, after closing, the buyer had to spend nearly
$7,000 improving the well to secure an adequate water supply. 7
8
The court formulated the issue by stating, "[tihe question presented
in this case is whether or not liability for innocent misrepresentation
should extend to the owner's agent, the real estate broker, where that
party serves as a conduit for the owner's misinformation.
79
After discussing the problem in general and commenting on the
broker's status as a "licensed professional" the court concluded,
75 28 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1947).
76 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982).
r Id. at 759.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 762.
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"[a]ccordingly, we hold that a purchaser who relies on a material
misrepresentation, even though innocently made, has a cause of
action against the broker originating or communicating the misrepre-
sentation." 80
Notice the effect of this decision on the broker and salesperson.
In order to avoid potential liability to a nonprincipal, the listing
broker and salesperson must verify information obtained from the
principal before communicating it to the buyer. Remember that this
rule does not apply to situations where the broker or salesperson
knows that the information supplied by the seller is false; that is
another theory of liability. Here liability can attach even when the
broker or salesperson believes the owner's statements are true. In
effect, this rule makes the broker an insurer of the accuracy of
material facts about the property communicated to the nonprincipal.
IX. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
1. A considerable amount of confusion exists in the real estate
brokerage marketplace, particularly on the part of buyers,
regarding who a licensee represents in a transaction;
2. Most buyers working with a selling broker (or salesperson)
tend to think of that individual as their advocate. Mandatory
disclosure of agency status does not eliminate this attitude;
3. To at least some extent, selling brokers and salespersons
share the attitude of buyers discussed in paragraph 2;
4. The traditional rules of agency law regarding seller subagency
are not reasonable and logical when applied to the modem
real estate brokerage market which is heavily driven by
multiple listing service arrangements;- and
5. The court-imposed duties on real estate licensees for the
benefit of nonprincipals should be carefully reviewed and
evaluated to preclude turning licensees into insurers of each
transaction.
80 Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
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The most desirable way to address these concerns is by legisla-
tive enactment of a state statute resolving all these issues simulta-
neously rather than depending on the case-by-case approach utilized
by the judicial system.
X. CONCLUSION
The law of agency as applied to modem real estate brokerage is
out of harmony with the reasonable expectations of real estate
licensees and the consuming public. Instead of trying to force the
behavior of licensees, buyers, and sellers into the mold of precedent-
bound concepts, agency law warrants reform. Accordingly, the states
should consider adopting the proposed model statute contained in
Appendix A. If adopted, this legislation would benefit both the
public and the real estate brokerage industry. Buyers would achieve
greater representation and protection. Further, legal duties and
responsibilities would more closely conform to the desires and
expectations of the parties to real estate transactions. The brokerage
industry would achieve greater certainty regarding the nature of its
legal obligations to both buyers and sellers.
XI. PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
A. Summary for Proposed Model Statute
I. The proposed statute attached hereto provides defini-
tions for the terms used therein.
II. It also sets up new presumptions in the law regarding
whom a broker represents. These are specified in
section 2.
III. Any multiple listing services requirements that the
selling broker be the seller's subagent are prohibited,
but selling brokers could still be sellers' subagents at
their option.
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IV. Buyers' agents may be compensated from the seller's
agent if full disclosure occurs.
V. When both the seller and buyer are represented by
their own agents, the duties owed by the respective
brokers to their nonprincipals are more narrow than
when only one side has an agent.
VI. The scope of duty owed by a broker to the
nonprincipal is specified in section 2, paragraphs (5)
and (6).
B. Statutory Language
A bill to be entitled:
An act relating to real estate brokerage; providing definitions;
providing real estate brokerage and agency principles,
presumptions, and duties for agents; providing an effective
date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. A section entitled Definitions to read:
(1) As used in this chapter, terms have the following
meanings: Note: The following terms (and others which
may be appropriate) should be listed and defined using the
existing statutory nomenclature or case law terminology as
may be appropriate in a particular state: (1) Regulatory
Commission, (2) Broker, (3) Salesperson, (4) Real property
or real estate, (5) Agent, (6) Agency Relationship, (7)
Subagent, (8) Principal, and (9) Nonprincipal.
Section 2. A section entitled Real Estate Brokerage and
Agency Principles to read:
(1) The following presumptions, which may be rebutted
by competent, substantial evidence shall apply in all
real estate transactions in this state. It is presumed
that:
(a) a broker securing a listing from a seller is the
seller's agent, and
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(b) a broker procuring a buyer for a transaction is
the buyer's agent, unless the broker is also the
seller's listing broker, in which case the broker
is the seller's agent.
(2) A broker may be the subagent of a principal provided
the principal gives express consent.
(3) It is against public policy for multiple listing services
or any other form of real estate listing data sharing
arrangements in this state to require brokers
participating in the service or arrangement to be
subagents of the listing broker when procuring the
buyer. Any such requirement created after the
effective date of the act is deemed to be void.
(4) Brokers who are buyer's agents may legally and
ethically receive compensation from seller's agents for
procuring the buyer in a transaction so long as the
receipt of such compensation is fully and completely
disclosed to the buyer.
(5) When both the buyer and the seller in a transaction
are served by their own agents, then the duties of
either broker to the party opposite from their principal
shall be limited to conduct that is fair, honest, and
candid and shall specifically exclude:
(a) any duty to inspect the property for the benefit
of the nonprincipal,
(b) any duty to advise the nonprincipal about the
advantages or disadvantages of any of the
contractual terms of the transaction, and
(c) any duty to verify any facts communicated to
the nonprincipal unless the broker either
knows or reasonably should suspect that such
facts are false.
(6) When there is no broker serving as the opposite
party's agent in a transaction, the duties of the broker
to the nonprincipal are not limited as set forth in
subparagraph (5) and may include matters specifically
excluded therein when such an inclusion would be
consistent with fair, honest, candid, and competent
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conduct on the part of an agent toward the nonprin-
cipal.
(7) A broker serving as an agent or subagent shall be
liable to the principal for any negligence in the
discharge of duties to the principal.
